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Abstract: 
Why has the extreme right Greek Golden Dawn, a party with clear links to 
fascism experienced a rise defying all theories that claim that such a party 
is unlikely to win in post-WWII Europe? And, if we accept that economic 
crisis is an explanation for this, why has such a phenomenon not occurred 
in other countries that have similar conducive conditions, such as Portugal 
and Spain? This article addresses this puzzle by (a) carrying out a 
controlled comparison of Greece, Portugal and Spain and (b) showing that 
the rise of the extreme right is not a question of intensity of economic 
crisis. Rather it is the nature of the crisis, i.e. economic versus overall crisis 
of democratic representation that facilitates the rise of the extreme right. 
We argue that extreme right parties are more likely to experience an 
increase in their support when economic crisis culminates into an overall 
crisis of democratic representation. Economic crisis is likely to become a 
political crisis when severe issues of governability impact upon the ability 
of the state to fulfil its social contract obligations. This breach of the social 
contract is accompanied by declining levels of trust in state institutions, 
resulting in party system collapse. 
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Breaching the social contract: crises of democratic 
representation and patterns of extreme right party support   
 
Introduction  
 
Most theories claim that extreme right parties cannot win in post-WWII Europe (e.g. 
Hainsworth 2008; Carter 2005; Art 2011). Fascist ideas associated with the 
authoritarian regimes of inter-war Europe are largely discredited because of their 
violence, authoritarianism and opposition to democracy. The far right parties that 
have experienced electoral support in post-war Europe tend to be those that have 
disassociated themselves from fascism and racist violence (e.g. Golder 2003; 
Halkiopoulou et al. 2013). However, in the context of the Eurozone crisis that erupted 
post-2009, the previously marginalised neo-Nazi Greek Golden Dawn marked its 
electoral breakthrough in May 2012 when it received 6.97 per cent of the votes cast, 
gaining 21 seats in a parliament of 300. This trend continued in both the 2014 
European Parliament (EP) elections when the party received 9.39 per cent of the votes 
cast and the January 2015 national elections, when it received 6.28 per cent as third 
biggest party in parliament. While it lost marginally since the 2012 elections, the 
result indicates consistent Golden Dawn support despite the fact that its leading 
members were imprisoned during the time of the election, facing indictment, and the 
party did little campaigning. 
 
The Golden Dawn is an extreme right party that may be described as a fascist or neo-
Nazi group. This differentiates the party from other far right populist parties that have 
been successful in other Western European countries since the 1980s both in terms of 
degree and it terms of kind. Not only does the Golden Dawn employ violence to 
pursue its extreme right ideological agenda; but most importantly this ideological 
agenda is premised on an alternative vision of democracy modelled on the principles 
of national socialism. As such we need to understand its rise through an analysis that 
goes beyond current explanations of the rise of this phenomenon in post-war Western 
Europe and examine countries that have specifically faced economic crisis.  
 
If we were, however, to attribute this to the economic crisis, then this begs the 
question of why extreme right parties have not been successful in the other countries, 
which have experienced comparable crisis conditions and severe economic 
breakdown, including Portugal and Spain. In these countries recent elections have 
shown no increase in support for the already marginalised extreme right National 
Renovator Party (PNR), Spain 2000 and National Democracy (DN). This article 
addresses this variation through a controlled comparison (Slater & Ziblatt 2013; 
Doner et al. 2005) between Greece, Portugal and Spain. We compare three cases, 
which share a number of economic, political and cultural similarities, but are 
exhibiting a variation in the dependent variable. This enables us to control for various 
explanations provided in the literature that may be held constant across our cases.  
 
Our comparison of Greece, Portugal and Spain indicates that it is the nature rather 
than the intensity of the crisis that increases the likelihood of the rise of the extreme 
right at times of economic hardship. We argue that extreme right parties are more 
likely to experience an increase in their support when economic crisis culminates into 
an overall crisis of democratic representation. Economic crisis is likely to become a 
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political crisis when severe issues of governability impact upon the ability of the state 
to fulfil its social contract obligations. This breach of the social contract is 
accompanied by declining levels of trust in state institutions, resulting in party system 
collapse. In these circumstances citizens may question the existing mechanisms of 
democratic representation, which opens space for parties that are anti-systemic and 
offer an alternative vision of representation. 
 
If our argument is correct, then economic crisis in itself is not enough to facilitate the 
rise of extreme right parties. This outcome is only likely if economic crisis is 
accompanied by severe problems of governability, resulting in a crisis of democratic 
representation. This article proceeds as follows. First, we contextualise the ‘puzzle’ 
focusing on the variation of extreme right party support in crisis-ridden Greece, 
Portugal and Spain. Second, we carry out a controlled comparison between the three 
countries. We show that Greece, Portugal and Spain share a number of demand and 
supply-side conditions including similar economic crisis dynamics, electoral systems, 
party competition dynamics, highly conservative right-wing competitors, history of 
right-wing authoritarianism and a fragmentation of the Right, eliminating these 
variables as potential causal explanations. Third, we posit our argument that goes 
beyond these explanations and focuses on democratic representation and party system 
collapse. We conclude with a discussion of our argument’s theoretical contribution 
and avenues for future research.  
 
The extreme right puzzle  
 
How may we define and understand the extreme right? This article places the extreme 
right within the overall umbrella term ‘far right’, which encompasses both radical and 
extreme right variants. The far right refers to a broad range of political parties and 
social groups whose common core ideological feature is nationalism (Eatwell 2000; 
Hainsworth 2008), i.e. a strict definition of the boundaries between the native group 
and the other and an emphasis on maintaining the homogeneity of the nation (Smith 
1991). Within this umbrella, we may distinguish between the radical and the extreme 
right. The radical right designates the ‘new’ parties that have emerged in Europe 
(Ignazi 1995) since the 1980s. These parties have adopted a modernised discourse that 
abandons outright references to race and claims a distance from fascism 
(Halikiopoulou et al. 2013). They are characterised by a populist rhetoric that 
differentiates between the ‘good people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’. The extreme right on 
the other hand designates parties and groups which have not distanced themselves 
from fascism: they tend to advocate a large state, employ violence in their tactics in 
an attempt to cleanse the homogenous nation from internal and external enemies. The 
extreme right may be defined as the antithesis of democracy (Mudde 2010), i.e. a 
rejection of procedural democracy and the idea that popular sovereignty may be 
exercised in accordance to electoral principles. While the extreme right variants are 
also populist, this concept differs in their ideology and agenda. They understand 
themselves primarily as movements from below that embody the will of the people 
rather than represent or speak on its behalf.  
 
Theories of the far right postulate that in general terms extreme right parties are not 
electorally successful (e.g. Betz 1998; Kitschelt with McGann 1995) in post-war 
Europe. The success of a far right party is inversely related to its proximity to fascism. 
The association of fascist ideals with totalitarianism, mass scales of violence, racial 
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extermination and an all-encompassing state has questioned the legitimacy of these 
parties. In essence fascism does not accept liberal representative democracy and 
ultimately seeks regime change. Since the 1980s, the far right parties that have been 
electorally successful are those that operate within the confines of liberal democracy 
and seek change from within. While also nationalist, these parties define ‘otherness’ 
not in strict racial terms but rather through ideological criteria (Halikiopoulou et al. 
2013). Exclusion is not justified on bloodline or birth traits, but rather on worldviews 
and systems of belief. Parties such as the Swiss People’s Party, the Dutch Party for 
Freedom and the True Finns that have enjoyed electoral support in their respective 
countries reject the fascist label, have been careful to disassociate themselves from 
such ideals and have centred their discourse around a rhetoric of toleration: excluding 
not those who are different by birth but those who because of their ideological beliefs 
are intolerant of the ideals of ‘our’ nation.  
 
If we accept this premise, the dramatic rise of the Greek Golden Dawn constitutes an 
anomaly. Other far right parties have enjoyed electoral success in Greece, for example 
the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and Independent Greeks (ANEL). However, 
these fall within the radical right category (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015) and 
their support is more consistent with the predictions of existing theories. By contrast, 
the Golden Dawn falls within the extreme right category. This is an ultra-nationalist 
and racist party that most resembles traditional Nazism both in terms of degree and in 
terms of kind: in its espousal of what Mann (2004) identifies as defining criteria of a 
fascist group, including nationalism, statism, paramilitarism, transcendence and 
cleansing. The party’s ideology emphasises the principles of National Socialism. It 
opposes democracy on a number of grounds, for example that it cannot be applied in 
practice; that it was not actually approv d by the ancient Greeks; and that it gives 
power to any lay man who may not endorse nationalist ideals (Vasilopoulou & 
Halikiopoulou 2015). The party’s organisational structures also resemble those of the 
Nazi system: violence, discipline and ultimate respect for the leader. While openly 
extreme, the party received support from over 400.000 Greek citizens during the May 
and June 2012 national elections, gaining 21 and 18 parliamentary seats out of 300 
respectively. It sustained its electoral base in the May 2014 EP elections, receiving 
9.39 per cent of the vote and gaining three seats in the EP. While in the January 2015 
general election support for the party dropped, the Golden Dawn still managed to 
attract 6.28 per cent of the votes cast, occupying third place in the Greek Parliament 
with 17 seats. Within the context of the imprisonment and pending indictment of its 
leading members, this is a significant result in itself and indicates that there is a 
substantial percentage of Greek voters that the Golden Dawn accommodates. It is 
notable that the party did not even participate in the electoral campaigns.  
 
This may urge us to attribute the electoral rise and persistence of the Golden Dawn to 
economic crisis and draw parallels with other countries that have experienced 
comparable crisis conditions. But this begs the question: why have extreme right 
parties in Spain and Portugal remained marginalised? In Portugal, the extreme right 
PNR received 0.2 per cent of the votes cast in 2009, which it raised marginally to 0.3 
per cent in 2011, indicating static and low levels of support. In Spain this was the case 
for Spain 2000, which although active in organising various community services such 
as soup kitchens which, modelled on the Nazi winterhilfswerk, are also used by the 
Golden Dawn; and DN, which despite its strong anti-immigrant agenda actually 
decreased its support (see table 1).  
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-----Table 1 about here-----   
 
These parties are comparable to the Golden Dawn in terms of their ideology, 
organisation and rejection of parliamentary democracy. They have a similar 
nationalist agenda, i.e. emphasising anti-immigration premised on the need to 
maintain the homogeneity of the nation and a return to traditional values. The 
Portuguese PNR celebrates ‘Salazar as the greatest 20th-century Portuguese 
statesman’ (Marchi 2013: 139). The party has been unsuccessful in its modernising 
attempts, remaining in what scholars categorise as the ‘old’ extreme right. Similarly 
Spain 2000 and DN may be termed as neo-Francoist or neo-fascist. Although these 
parties have attempted to put forward a more moderate image and attract mostly 
conservative right-wing voters, they ‘keep alive the historical memory of Spanish 
fascism, the Civil War and the Franco regime’ (Rodriguez Jimenez 2012: 117).  
 
This variation raises the following two inter-related questions: Why has an extreme 
right party with clear links to fascism experienced such a rise in Greece, defying all 
theories that claim that such a party is unlikely to win in post-WWII Europe? And, if 
we accept that economic crisis is an explanation for this, why has such a phenomenon 
not occurred in other countries that have similar conducive conditions, such as 
Portugal and Spain?  
 
Comparing Greece, Portugal and Spain  
 
This article employs the most similar systems research design (Slater & Ziblatt 2013) 
in order to identify the conditions, which have facilitated the rise of an extreme righ 
party in Greece but not in Portugal and Spain. These countries share a number of 
political, cultural and economic similarities that allow for a meaningful comparison 
(Hartlapp and Leiber 2010; Zartaloudis 2013). In terms of their political landscapes, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain are all characterised by a strong left-right divide and have 
experienced civil war and right-wing authoritarianism in their recent histories. All 
three became democracies during the third wave of democratisation and joined the 
EU in the 1980s. They all are European peripheral countries with similar levels of 
socio-economic development, which formed the main beneficiaries of the EU’s 
structural and cohesion funds prior to the Eastern enlargement. These countries have 
been affected by the Eurozone crisis more than any other Eurozone member. They 
were identified as the three most at-risk European economies during the European 
sovereign debt crisis, they all received external financial assistance and experienced 
severe austerity measures and public sector cuts. Yet, only Greece has experienced 
the rise of an extreme right party. Taking this variation into account, this article is 
concerned with the comparative dimension of extreme right party support.  
 
The second step in carrying out a meaningful comparison is to identify potential 
explanatory variables as discussed in the literature. Scholars have identified a number 
of factors as possible explanations for the rise of the far right understood in the broad, 
umbrella sense. These may be categorised in terms of demand (Bell 1964; Lipset 
1960; Ramet 1999; Golder 2003) and supply (Mudde 2010; Norris 2005). Demand-
side explanations postulate that ‘“structurally determined pathologies” triggered by 
“extreme conditions” (i.e. crises)’ result in the rise of far right parties (Mudde 2010: 
1171). Such parties ‘appeal to the disgruntled and the psychologically homeless, to 
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the personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, 
unsophisticated, and authoritarian persons at every level of the society’ (Lipset 1960: 
173). External triggers such as economic crises, globalisation and other societal 
changes create societies of winners and losers in which the dispossessed and 
unemployed will express their protest by opting for a far right party (Kriesi et al. 
2006). Far right parties are able to capitalise on the insecurities of downward social 
mobility. For example, the inter-war economic crisis and the wide social discontent it 
generated have been closely linked with the rise of Nazism and fascism in Europe 
(Lipset 1960). Supply-side explanations focus on the opportunities and constraints 
offered by the political-institutional context within which parties operate. The 
existence of political space for far right parties may depend upon the electoral system 
(Carter 2002); party competition (Mudde 2007); the existence of a mainstream right-
wing competitor and its ability to absorb far right voters (Ellwood 1995; Chibber & 
Torcal 1997); and the fragmentation of the Right into various factions that are 
unwilling to coalesce (Marchi 2013).  
 
We proceed by applying each of these explanations to the context of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain. The logic of comparison eliminates a number of the above demand and 
supply-side variables as causal explanations. Our first step is to compare certain 
demand-side indicators relevant to the Eurozone crisis as the external trigger, given 
that all three countries have experienced the worst of the crisis. We compare Greece, 
Portugal and Spain against a number of ‘misery indicators’ (Pappas & O’Malley 
2014). These include government deficit as percentage of GDP across the Eurozone, 
levels of unemployment and youth unemployment as well as real GDP growth rate to 
measure recession. We define recession in terms of two consecutive quarters of 
negative growth (Keely & Love 2010). Our three cases have the highest rates of 
government deficit as percentage of GDP across the Eurozone. In 2009 with the onset 
of the crisis, Greece had a government deficit of -15.2; Portugal with -9.8; and Spain -
10.9. This similar trend of high government deficit continued up to 2013. 
Unemployment rates are also very high and dramatically increased since the onset of 
the crisis in all three countries. Similarly youth unemployment is particularly high 
across all three countries and well above the EU average. Measuring the dynamics of 
economic development, real GDP growth rate shows a similar picture: economic 
recession over consecutive years among all three countries (see table 2). This 
indicates that economic indicators alone are not enough to explain variation in 
extreme right party support across the three cases.  
 
 
-----Table 2 about here---- 
 
The logic of comparison also eliminates a number of supply-side variables. First, we 
examine the electoral system. Because proportional electoral systems tend to favour 
representation of smaller parties, we might expect electoral system variation to play a 
role in the success of far right parties (Norris 2005; Alonso and Kaltwasser 2015). 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, however, all have similar electoral systems. They all 
adopt a list-proportional electoral system, either closed or open. Despite this 
proportional element, all three adopt the D’Hondt formula, which favours large 
parties; and in Greece and Spain the electoral system tends to have a majoritarian 
effect, creating a party system where power tends to alternate between two main 
competitors (Freire 2005; Pappas 2003; Hopkin 2005). The majoritarian effect is less 
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prevalent in Portugal. But even if this is the case, the same pattern holds for EP 
election results, where the electoral system is even more standardised across cases 
(Hix and Hagemann 2009). Despite having a closed ballot structure and large district 
magnitude, the three countries show a variation in extreme right party support.    
 
This is consistent with a number of theories that have found that the electoral system 
is not necessary causally related to the rise of far right parties (Carter 2005; van der 
Brug, Fennema & Tillie 2005; Arzheimer & Carter 2006). Therefore it makes sense to 
proceed by examining a related issue, i.e. party-system dynamics prior to the 
Eurozone crisis. Theories posit that multi-party systems are more conducive to far 
right party success than two party systems or systems characterised by bipolarity. All 
three cases exhibit bipolarity in their party system dynamics. Two mainstream parties, 
a centre-left and a centre-right, are the two most relevant actors and have tended to 
alternate in power. In Greece the centre-right New Democracy and the centre-left 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which, until recently, together occupied 
the vast majority of the 300 parliamentary seats (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 
2013) have dominated the political scene in the post-dictatorship era. In Portugal, 
competition takes place primarily between the centre-left Socialist Party (PS) and the 
centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSD), often in coalition with the right-wing 
CDS-People’s Party, which have constituted the main political actors in the system 
(Freire 2005). And in Spain, state-wide vote has been concentrated around the centre-
right People’s Party (PP) and th  centre-left Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) 
(Hopkin 2005).  
 
The logic of comparison illustrates that it is also problematic to attribute the low 
support for far right parties in Portugal and Spain to the existence of a mainstream 
right-wing competitor able to appropriate potential demand for far right ideas 
(Ellwood 1995; Chhibber & Torcal 1997). This is because the presence of a highly 
conservative mainstream competitor is constant across our cases: all three have a 
strong centre-right party or bloc, which could absorb such voters (see table 3). The 
Greek New Democracy, the Portuguese CDS-People’s Party and the Spanish PP all 
score very highly on various dimensions that capture traditional-authoritarian party 
positions (the GAL/TAN dimension) (Bakker et al. 2015) including law and order, 
social lifestyle, religious principles in politics, immigration policy, integration of 
immigrants and asylum seekers, nationalism and position towards ethnic minorities. 
While the Portuguese PSD scores lower compared to the Greek New Democracy and 
Spanish PP, the more authoritarian space is occupied by the CDS-People’s Party, 
which often runs jointly with the PSD.  
 
----Table 3 about here---- 
 
In addition, Greece, Portugal and Spain share a legacy of right-wing authoritarianism, 
entailing that if we make the claim that the Right is discredited because of its 
historical association with right-wing authoritarianism, then this should be true across 
all three. Greece experienced right-wing authoritarianism during the Metaxas 
dictatorship (1936-1941) and the Colonels’ junta (1967-1974); Portugal during the 
1926-1933 military dictatorship followed by the Estado Novo period (1933-1974); 
and Spain during the Restoration period under Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) and the 
Franco regime (1939-1975).  
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Equally problematic is the attempt to attribute the lack of support for far right parties 
in Spain and Portugal to the fragmentation of the Right. If one of the reasons that 
Portugal and Spain have not experienced a rise of extreme right parties is the 
unwillingness of the various extreme right-wing factions to coalesce (Marchi 2013, 
133; Alonso & Kaltwasser 2015), then we should expect the fragmentation of the 
Right to have similar effects in Greece. However, a number of extreme right parties 
competed for elections since the 1980s, including Front Line, the Hellenism Party, the 
Hellenic Front, the National Coalition, the Patriotic Alliance and the Golden Dawn.  
 
In a nutshell, we have shown that Greece, Portugal and Spain share a number of 
demand and supply-side conditions including similar economic dynamics, electoral 
systems, party competition dynamics, highly conservative right-wing competitors, 
history of right-wing authoritarianism and a fragmentation of the Right. Therefore our 
comparison illustrates that these variables are short of accounting for the variation in 
extreme right party support across the three cases. This does not necessarily entail that 
demand and supply-side dynamics are irrelevant to the variation but rather, that we 
need to theoretically nuance and reconceptualise the interdependence between 
demand and supply th ough a different prism: the broader implications of economic 
crisis in the institutional, political and democratic spheres. We proceed to construct 
our argument below.  
 
 
----Table 4 about here---- 
 
 
The rise of the extreme right: A crisis of democratic representation  
 
We argue that extreme right parties are more likely to experience an increase in their 
support when economic crisis culminates into a crisis of democratic representation. 
Our logic is as follows: economic crisis is likely to become a political crisis when 
there are severe issues of governability. In turn this may acquire an ideological 
dimension when the state is less able to mediate the effects of the crisis and fulfil its 
social contract obligations. This challenges not simply the legitimacy of individual 
parties but the legitimacy of the system itself.  This results in low levels of trust in 
state institutions undermining the social basis of the main competitors in the system 
(Morgan 2011). Large parts of society protest against their perceived inability to 
influence decision-making and hold politicians accountable. The dominance of the old 
established parties is challenged, resulting in party system collapse as ‘citizens do not 
believe that representatives are acting on behalf of their constituents or of some vision 
of a public good’ (Mainwaring et al. 2006: 15). In these circumstances citizens 
question the existing mechanisms of democratic representation, which opens space for 
parties that are anti-systemic and offer an alternative vision of representation. These 
parties of the margins offer this alternative vision while at the same time -precisely 
because of their fringe status- remain disassociated with the ‘old discredited’ system. 
Therefore, economic crisis is not by itself sufficient to facilitate the rise of an extreme 
right party. This is not a question of intensity of economic crisis. Rather it is the 
nature of the crisis, i.e. economic versus overall crisis of democratic representation 
that facilitates the rise of the extreme right.  
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In order to illustrate our argument we apply literature on democratic representation 
and party system collapse (Mann 2004; Mainwaring et al. 2006; Seawright 2012; 
Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015). The starting point is the extent to which 
economic crisis is accompanied by severe problems of governability, thus acquiring a 
political dimension. Perceptions of state capacity are the link between political crisis 
and ideological crisis. This refers to the perceived inability of the state to mediate the 
effects of the crisis and to deliver services based on the redistribution of the collective 
goods of the state (Slater et al. 2014). Thus the political and ideological dimensions of 
the crisis are the defining factors: the strength of democratic institutions (Pappas 
2013), state capacity (Slater et al. 2014), and the ability of the state to meet its social 
contract obligations (Wimmer 1997) and to continue the provision of basic services 
and redistribution (Pappas & O’Malley 2014). When state capacity is limited or 
perceived to be limited, then the result is the delegitimization of the party system as a 
whole. This is because the system is perceived as incapable to address the crisis and 
mediate its socioeconomic effects. The result is low levels of trust and party system 
collapse. One of the major differences between Greece, Portugal and Spain is the 
extent to which the crisis triggered the breakdown of the political system itself 
because of the perceived limited ability of the state to address the crisis. In Portugal 
and Spain, the state was perceived as better able to limit the socio-economic impact of 
the crisis on individual citizens.  
 
We may measure this through the use of a number of indicators that measure good 
governance and the perceived efficacy of the state (World Bank 2012; Transparency 
International 2011; Kopecky et al. 2012). Governance refers to the ability of 
institutions to control their societies (Peters 1995). The World Bank defines 
governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank 1992). Good 
governance is expected to increase satisfaction and trust. Thus such indicators tend to 
be used as proxies for good governance (Kaufmann et al. 2010). Trust in institutions 
may include measuring trust in the national parliament; trust in political parties; and 
trust in politicians. Overall satisfaction may be measured with levels of satisfaction 
with democracy in the country. Failing performance of the state may be measured 
with (1) perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality and impartiality of 
the civil service, and the credibility of the government in terms of policy formulation 
and implementation (government effectiveness); (2) the ability of the government to 
regulate the private sector (regulatory quality); (3) confidence in the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement (Rule of Law); and (4) the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain (control of corruption/corruption 
perceptions index). Finally failing performance may be also measured in terms of 
party patronage and clientelism (Afonso et al. 2015) and the extent to which political 
parties are able to exercise direction over appointments within state institutions (party 
patronage index) (see figure 1 and table 5). Party patronage tends to be understood as 
a ‘form of linkage politics’ whereby parties and/or politicians (patrons) distribute 
benefits to voters (clients) in exchange for electoral support. Kopecky et al.’s (2012) 
conception of patronage as an organisational resource instead focuses on the ability of 
parties to build organisational networks and distribute jobs within the state, thus 
obtaining institutional control of the latter. 
 
An examination of these indicators illustrates that Greece scores very poorly both in 
stand-alone terms and compared to Portugal and Spain. We measure trust in 
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institutions and satisfaction with democracy through citizen responses in the 
European Social Survey. We choose to report citizens’ responses for the 2010 wave 
because it is the most recent study that includes all three countries since the outbreak 
of the crisis. While there is a general trend in Europe of low levels of trust in 
institutions and satisfaction with democracy, on average Greece scores much lower 
than Portugal and Spain (see figure 1).  
 
----Figure 1 about here---- 
 
In terms of state performance and perceptions of quality of state services, Greece also 
ranks poorly compared to the other two cases. Perceptions of government 
effectiveness are very low in Greece. The country scores a mere 52 compared to 
Portugal’s 81 and Spain’s 82. In terms of regulatory quality, Greece scores 68, which 
may be contrasted to 76 in Portugal and 78 in Spain. In terms of the Rule of Law, 
Greece again exhibits the lowest score at 64 while Portugal and Spain score 82 and 83 
respectively. In terms of control of corruption, Greece scores a very low 51 compared 
Portugal’s 78 and Spain’s 82 (World Bank 2012). In accordance to the Corruption 
perceptions index constructed by Transparency International (2011), the contrast is 
sharp. Greece is ranked 80
th
 with a mere 3.4 out of 10, while Portugal is ranked 32
nd
 
with a 6.1 and Spain 31
st
 with 6.2. According to Kopecky’s et al. (2012) index of 
party patronage, Greece is by far the highest and above the EU average at 0.62, 
whereas Portugal and Spain score much lower at 0.29 and 0.40 respectively. This is 
significant in light of the dynamics of the Greek political system, which is 
traditionally based on patronage and clientelism (Mitsopoulos & Pelagides 2011; 
Pappas 2003).  In this case, Greece constitutes the paradox vis-à-vis Portugal and 
Spain given its ability to sustain a democratic institutional system during the post-
dictatorship era ‘while not progressing beyond the entrenched and deeply embedded 
clientelistic and rent-seeking networks that permeate Greek political culture’ 
(Vasilopoulou et al. 2014). The crisis challenged this clientelistic system at its core, 
discrediting the main actors and resulting in low levels of trust in democratic 
institutions. 
 
----Table 5 about here--- 
 
 
Low levels of trust, the weakness of the state and its perceived lack of efficacy to 
moderate the effects of the crisis resulted in a crisis of representation, which brought 
about the collapse of the party system in Greece whereas in the other two cases this 
did not take place. The Greek May and June 2012 elections were characterised by the 
highest levels of volatility since the restoration of democracy in 1974. Not only did 
the elections result in the implosion of the incumbent PASOK which received a mere 
33 seats compared to the 160 seats it had received in 2009; but the main opposition 
party also suffered great losses and the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), a 
radical party with an anti-memorandum agenda formerly in the fringes of the party 
system, emerged as the main contender. Beyond punishing the incumbent, Greek 
voters punished the two main parties, which were perceived as the main source of the 
inefficiency and corrupt nature of the system, indicating that the two main contenders 
had lost their social base (Verney 2014).  
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This trend was sustained during both the 2014 EP elections and the January 2015 
national elections which both resulted in SYRIZA gaining first party position and the 
Golden Dawn third. The result was the emergence of a new cleavage in Greece 
expressed through a strong support for anti-systemic and anti-memorandum parties 
(Dinas & Rori 2013; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2013). In other words, the crisis 
of political representation opened space for parties that offer an alternative vision of 
representation and more broadly an alternative solution to the crisis, which rested 
outside the confines of the system, such as the Golden Dawn.   
 
Because levels of trust, state capacity and perceptions of the efficacy of the state to 
handle the crisis were higher Portugal and Spain, the crisis did not result into a crisis 
of democratic representation. In the two countries, voters blamed the incumbent party 
for its inability to manage the economy. This however, did not translate into the 
implosion of the incumbent, nor in a major restructuring of the party system itself 
(Fernandes 2011; Martin & Urquizu-Sancho 2012). Electoral competition took place 
along familiar divisions with no emergence of systemic/anti-systemic or pro-
memorandum/anti-memorandum cleavages. While in Spain new parties did enter the 
system, overall competition dynamics did not change dramatically, and in both cases 
resulted in the main opposition party emerging as the winner.  
 
In Portugal party dynamics remained broadly similar to previous years. In 2011, 
elections resulted in a clear victory for the centre-right PSD, gaining approximately 
10 per cent. The party received 105 seats while the centre-left PS 73 seats, compared 
to 78 and 96 in 2009 and 72 and 120 in 2005 respectively. Anti-system parties were 
not able to capitalise on the crisis; in fact ‘in absolute terms, the PCP lost 6,000 votes 
and the BE lost almost half of its electoral base’ (Fernandes 2011: 1300). Classic 
dynamics of alternation between the two main contenders in the system continued 
during the 2014 EP elections in which the PS came first.
1
  
 
Similarly in the 2011 Spanish national elections voters punished the incumbent 
centre-left PSOE, granting instead the mandate to govern to its main centre-right 
opposition party PP. PSOE suffered a sharp electoral decline losing a large number of 
seats. It received 110 seats in 2011, compared to 169 i  2008, lowering its support 
from 43.9 per cent to 28.8 per cent. But unlike Greece, no fundamental restructuring 
or collapse of the party system took place. Competition remained concentrated around 
the centre-right PP and the centre-left PSOE, while the latter still remains a potent 
contender, unlike the Greek PASOK, which became replaced by SYRIZA as the main 
opposition party. The campaign focused on competence in handling economic issues 
and overall it was of low-intensity (Martin & Urquizu-Sancho 2012). This trend 
continued during the 2014 EP elections where the PP came first. During these 
elections both PP and PSOE decreased their percentages, while a new contender, the 
far left PODEMOS came fourth with 7.98 per cent. However, EP elections are second 
order elections that tend to inflate support for small parties, and as such are not 
necessarily an indication that party system collapse began to take place in Spain in 
2014. In any case, this is not inconsistent with our argument: crisis of democratic 
representation is not static and may take place in different countries at different times.  
 
                                               
1
 For a comparative discussion of Portugal and Greece, please see Freire, A. Lisi, M., Andreadis, I. & 
Leite Viegas, J.M. ‘Political Representation in times of Bailout: Evidence from Portugal and Greece’, 
Special Issue of South European Society and Politics 19 no 4 (2014). 
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Conclusion  
 
Why has an extreme right party with clear links to fascism experienced a rise in 
Greece defying all theories that claim that such a party is unlikely to win in post-
WWII Europe? And, if we accept that economic crisis is an explanation for this, why 
has such a phenomenon not occurred in other countries that have similar conducive 
conditions, such as Portugal and Spain? This article has addressed this puzzle by (a) 
eliminating potential explanatory variables through a systematic comparison of 
Greece, Portugal and Spain; and (b) showing that the rise of the extreme right is not a 
question of intensity of economic crisis. Rather it is the nature of the crisis, i.e. 
economic versus overall crisis of democratic representation that facilitates the rise of 
the extreme right. 
 
Our argument centres on the impact of economic crisis on democratic representation. 
Economic crisis is likely to have a political dimension when severe issues of 
governability impact upon the ability of the state to mediate the effects of economic 
hardship. This breach of the social contract is accompanied by declining levels of 
trust in state institutions, resulting in party system collapse. In these circumstances 
citizens may question the existing mechanisms of democratic representation, which 
opens space for parties that are anti-systemic and offer an alternative vision of 
representation. In Portugal and Spain on the one hand, the economic crisis did not 
result into an overall crisis of democratic representation. Rather than party system 
collapse, the incumbent political parties suffered the political responsibility for the 
crisis in a typical power alternation fashion. In Greece on the other hand the economic 
crisis led to a major discrediting of the two main actors in the system and the 
delegitimisation of the system itself, altering party system dynamics and opening up 
space for smaller parties that offer an alternative vision of democratic representation.  
 
Our theoretical contribution is twofold. First, we build on existing literature, which 
argues that economic crisis will not necessarily lead to the rise of extreme right 
parties (Mudde 2007; Art 2011), and illustrate that in fact it is the rarest outcome. We 
arrive at this conclusion through a comparative logic. An interpretation of the increase 
in support for the Golden Dawn as a direct product of the Eurozone crisis would 
constitute a fallacy resulting from the endeavour to study Greece as an outlier or a 
single case study. Such an approach lacks the potential to control for alternative 
explanations and to construct a theory of extreme right party support at times of crisis 
that will have applicability beyond one particular case study. Our controlled 
comparison establishes that institutional factors such as electoral system, party 
competition, highly conservative right-wing competitors, and the fragmentation of the 
Right, treated in most of the literature as explanatory variables, do not explain the rise 
of extreme right parties at times of crisis.  
 
Second, we show that what allowed the emergence of the anti-systemic Golden Dawn 
in Greece was not the economic crisis per; but rather its political dimension, i.e. the 
perceived inability of the state to mediate it, resulting in a crisis of democratic 
representation. By taking into account issues of governability, perceptions of state 
capacity and the extent to which an economic crisis becomes translated into a political 
crisis with systemic consequences (Mann 2004; Slater et al. 2014), we apply theories 
that focus on democratic representation and party system collapse in other regional 
contexts. In doing so we differentiate the rise of the Golden Dawn in Greece from the 
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general phenomenon of the rise of far right populism in Western Europe during times 
of affluence and economic stability. 
 
Greece, Portugal and Spain have offered us an ideal platform upon which to test the 
impact of economic crisis on extreme right party support. We have not included 
Ireland in our comparison. Despite having experienced similar crisis conditions, 
Ireland is dissimilar to Greece, Portugal and Spain in terms of a number of historical, 
political and institutional variables, and could thus skew our controlled comparison. 
The Irish party system is not defined by a left-right cleavage. Unlike in other 
European countries, Irish parties are not directly linked to a specific class. Fianna Fail 
and Fine Gail have been divided on a number of historical and identity issues, 
including religion, the Irish civil war, and between 1969 and 1986 the question of 
Northern Ireland. The country has not experienced right-wing authoritarianism and 
has never witnessed the considerable political presence of an extreme right party. 
Hence we have confined our universe of cases to three countries that share a number 
of similarities that could be potentially causal thus allowing for a controlled 
comparison.  
 
These important similarities have allowed us to control for -and therefore eliminate- a 
variety of existing explanations and posit our argument on democratic representation 
and party system collapse. However, the comparative method is limited by design to a 
specified universe of cases. While our application of this method has shown that our 
findings apply to Greece, Portugal and Spain, the question arises whether these 
findings may be generalised beyond our sample. If we are right and our argument has 
external validity, countries that are experiencing economic crisis and extreme right 
party support are more likely to exhibit low or declining levels of trust in state 
institutions, declining perceptions of state capacity and severe problems of 
governability. Based on the findings obtained here, future research could examine 
other countries that have experienced economic crisis in greater detail, looking at the 
relationship between the rise of right-wing extremism and crisis of democratic 
representation. For example, the rise of Jobbik in Hungary could provide a good 
platform for testing our argument. Future research could also identify limits or 
additional circumstances that may alter dynamics in different settings; explaining for 
example the limited support for the Cypriot National Popular Front (ELAM) which is 
a sister party of the Golden Dawn. Finally future research could focus on an analysis 
of the strategies and discourses of extreme right parties in order to nuance the ways in 
which these parties may themselves shape their own electoral fortunes when structural 
conditions are ripe.  
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Table 4: Demand and supply-side variables  
 
   Greece Portugal Spain  
Control 
variables 
Demand  External Financial 
Assistance  
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Government deficit as 
% of GDP 
High High High 
Unemployment  High High High 
Youth Unemployment  High High High 
Real GDP growth rate Negative Negative  Negative  
Supply  Electoral system PR-Open list 
D’Hondt 
PR-Closed list 
D’Hondt  
PR-Closed list 
D’Hondt 
Party competition  Two main 
contenders 
Two main blocks Two main 
contenders 
Mainstream right-wing 
competitor 
High scores on 
GAL/TAN 
dimension 
High scores on 
GAL/TAN 
dimension 
High scores on 
GAL/TAN 
dimension 
Fragmentation of the 
Right 
Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent  
variable 
 Support for extreme 
right-wing parties 
Increase No increase No increase 
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Table 1: Electoral results of the far right in Greece, Portugal and Spain  
 
Greece Golden Dawn  
2015 6.28 
2014 EP 9.39  
2012 June 6.92 
2012 May 6.97 
2009 0.29 
Portugal PNR 
2014 EP 0.46  
2011 0.32 
2009 0.2 
Spain Spain 2000 DN  
2014 EP 0.00 0.08 
2011 0.04 0.01 
2008 0.03 0.05 
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Table 2: Economic indicators  
 
 
 
Sources: Government Deficit: OECD https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-
deficit.htm#indicator-chart ; Unemployment and Youth Unemployment: Eurostat 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en; Real GDP 
growth rate: Eurostat 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115&
plugin=1 
 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Government deficit 
Greece -6.1 -6.7 -9.9 -15.2 -11.0 -10.1 -8.6 -12.1 n/a 
Portugal -4.3 -3.0 -3.8 -9.8 -11.2 -7.4 -5.5 -4.9 n/a 
Spain 2.2 2.0 -4.4 -10.9 -9.4 -9.4 -10.3 -6.8 n/a 
Unemployment 
Greece 9.0 8.4 7.8 9.6 12.7 17.9 24.5 27.5 26.5 
Portugal 8.8 9.2 8.7 10.7 12.0 12.9 15.8 16.4 14.1 
Spain 8.5 8.2 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.5 
Youth unemployment (under 25 years) 
Greece 25.0 22.7 21.9 25.7 33.0 44.7 55.3 58.3 52.3 
Portugal 21.1 21.5 21.5 25.3 27.9 30.3 37.9 38.1 34.8 
Spain 17.9 18.1 24.5 37.7 41.5 46.2 52.9 55.5 53.2 
Real GDP growth rate 
Greece 5.8 3.5 -0.4 -4.4 -5.4 -8.9 -6.6 -3.9 0.8 
Portugal 1.6 2.5 0.2 -3 1.9 -1.8 -3.3 -1.4 0.9 
Spain 4.2 3.8 1.1 -3.6 0 -0.6 -2.1 -1.2 1.4 
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Table 3: Party positions on the GAL/TAN dimension  
 
Greece Portugal Portugal Spain 
New Democracy 
Social 
Democratic Party CDS-People's Party People’s Party 
Civil liberties vs. law and order 8 5.5 9 7.66667 
Social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality)  7.09091 6.5 9.16667 7.81818 
The role of religious principles in politics  8.09091 6 8.6 7.63636 
Immigration policy 7.8 6 8.5 7.18182 
Multiculturalism vs. assimilation 7.36364 5.2 7.8 7.7 
Ethnic minorities  6.90909 5 7.4 7.81818 
Gal/Tan Dimension  7.3000002 6.8333335 8.8000002 8.166667 
 
Source: Chapel Hill Expert survey 2010 (Bakker et al. 2012). 
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Figure 1: Average trust in institutions and satisfaction with democracy 
 
 
 
Source: European Social Survey (2010) 
0 2 4 6 8 10
Trust in parliament
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Table 5: Good governance indicators  
 
 Greece Portugal  Spain 
Government 
effectiveness 
p-Rank 2012 
62 81 82 
Regulatory 
quality/ p-
Rank 2012 
68 76 78 
Rule of law/ 
p-Rank 2012 
64 82 83 
Control of 
corruption/ 
p-Rank 2012 
51 78 82 
Corruption 
perceptions 
index 2011   
 
3.4 (rank 80) 6.1 (rank 32) 6.2 (rank 31) 
Patronage 
index  
0.62 0.29 0.40 
Sources: World Bank for Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of 
Law and Control of corruption; Transparency international for Corruption 
Perceptions Index; and Kopecky et al 2010 for patronage index.  
 
Page 22 of 22Government and Opposition
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
